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With the continued trend of globalization, more and more firms have been taking advantage of 25 global supply chains to improve their competitive edge by lowering cost, accelerating product 26 development, and getting access to natural and human resources in the international arena 27 (Boyd et al. 2004 ). As firms enjoy the benefits, many leading global brands such as Nike, GAP, 28 Adidas, and McDonalds have been faced with intense pressure for socially responsible supply 29 chain management (Amaeshi et al. 2008) . A commonly observed response to this pressure is 30 that the primary firm introduces codes of conduct to ensure its partners' business practices to 31 be socially responsible (Pedersen and Andersen 2006) . However, World Bank (2003) reports 32 the difficulty in implementing these codes of conduct due to a wide variety of individual codes 33 on corporate social responsibility (CSR), the effectiveness of the top-down CSR structure, and 34 insufficient understanding of business benefits of CSR commitment. 35 CSR has historically been a significant theme in the business community and attracted 36 considerable research interests from academia. For instance, a survey of the Economist (2005) 37 shows that 85% of 136 executives and 65 investors view CSR as a "central" or "important" Here, an alternative assumption is that F and S simultaneously choose q and w in the same stage. In this case, S's profit function is written as  S ( y F , y S ,w,q)  wq  c S y S and F's profit function and reaction function are the same as those in the sequential-move case. Next, we will show that the unique Nash equilibrium is q  0 and w  a( y F  y S ) . Firstly, for any given q  0 , as S's profit linearly increases in w, S's optimal reaction is the upper bound w  a( y F  y S ) , which in turn makes F choose q  0 by (2). This implies that any q  0 cannot be in a Nash equilibrium. In addition, for q  0 , if S chooses w  a( y F  y S ) , then F will choose q  0 as per (2). This confirms that q  0 and w  a( y F  y S ) cannot be in an equilibrium, either. Finally, for w  a( y F  y S ) , F's optimal reaction is q  0 , which makes S indifferent for all w in
  arises as the unique Nash equilibrium.
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Note that these two profit functions are convex and quadratic, so the profit achieves its 299 maximum at either the upper or lower bound. As such, the optimal reaction of F (S) to its 300 opponent is to choose 0 or / 
In (6), we assume for tie-breaking that S chooses the greater
The same assumption is applied to F's reaction function (7). 308
Analogically, F's reaction function is
Reaction functions (6) and (7) imply that the greater S y ( F y ) chosen by S (F), the more 311 likely its opponent will be induced to select its upper bound / With the reaction functions (6) and (7), the Nash equilibriums of the stage-1 subgame are 325 derived as shown in Lemma 1.
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Lemma 1:
and # ( , , , )
is the unique Nash equilibrium.
328
(ii) if # ( , , , ) 0
the unique Nash equilibrium. 
y y  is the unique Nash equilibrium.
336
The proof of this lemma is given in the Appendix A.1.
337
With the aforesaid equilibrium result for the stage-1 subgame, the subgame perfect Nash 
and the corresponding equilibrium profits are 
Main Results
359
Next, comparative statics are presented about the equilibriums derived in Section 2.2. In the 360 following study, it is assumed that changes are examined one at a time. When one parameter is 361 considered for possible changes, all other parameters are assumed to remain constant. raising resource commitment to CSR activities, and improving CSR operational efficiency.
428
Note that the two-echelon supply chain considered here is characterized by strategic 429 importance parameters ( S C and F C ) and operational efficiency parameters ( S c , and F c ).
430
We shall examine more carefully how the corresponding system parameter thresholds obtained 
and similarly define as # ( , , , , ) 
is the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if any of the following three conditions is The proof of Proposition 6 is provided in Appendix A.6. 
Concluding Remarks
555
In this paper we take a strategic CSR view and assume that relative to a non-CSR product, a 556 CSR product provides consumers with some extra benefit which varies across those consumers.
557
This assumption implies that CSR can be used as both a vertical and horizontal product 
This indicates that the equilibrium profit functions for S and F are nondecreasing after the 748
